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1 Introduction
Contract law and tort law are a set of organically grown rules with their
roots in history. The same holds true for private law remedies ancillary
to these rules, such as the right to compensation, the right to specific
performance, restoration in kind, et cetera. These roots are important
in understanding and explaining the present state of contract law and
tort law. From a dogmatic and logical point of view, however, remedies
need more than historical understanding and explaining: they are
constantly in need of justification and purpose. Therefore, from time to
time the rules on contract law and tort law need recalibration in order
to ensure their efficacy.1 With this lecture, I hope to contribute to that
process.2
Substantive rules are created with one goal or more goals in mind.
Theoretically speaking, these goals are supposed to be reached by means
of compliance with the rule. Compliance in turn is served by instru-
ments of enforcement, remedies. To serve the goals set by the substan-
tive rule, remedies must have the capacity to produce the desired effect.
So, remedies in contract and tort can be evaluated on the basis of their
efficacy, their capacity to serve the goals of contract law and tort law.
As a rule, legislators, courts, and legal doctrine should periodically
evaluate efficacy and thus address the question whether the substantive
rules of contract and tort law – and, indeed, the aims of the whole body
of the law of contract and tort – as such are still efficaciously served by
these instruments of enforcement. And if not, then perhaps we should
look for alternative remedies. The reason for this is simple: substantive
rules are in need of efficacious remedies. Otherwise, what would be the
point of having a substantive rule?3 Evaluation of the status quo may
reveal that alternative remedies or alternative designs for remedies
could help reach the goals set by the rule more efficaciously.
1. In this lecture ‘efficacy’ refers to the potency to produce a desired effect. The term is
slightly more theoretically oriented than ‘effectiveness’, which alludes to empirical evi-
dence of the desired effect.
2. Many opportunities were given to me to discuss drafts of this paper, enabling me to
amend and refine my arguments. I owe special thanks to my colleagues at Erasmus Uni-
versity Rotterdam, the participants to seminars at both the Erasmus University Rotter-
dam and Amsterdam University (UvA), and to the following persons in particular for
helpful comments: Roger Van den Bergh, Ivo Giesen, Ton Hartlief, and Siewert Linden-
bergh. Melissa Moncada Castillo provided indispensible research assistance. The linguis-
tic assistance that Suja Suryanarayanan provided is gratefully acknowledged.
3. Cf. Verheij 2002, p. 464.
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An example of a rule in private law that has a clear goal and can be
evaluated accordingly in terms of efficacy is the rule that debtors
should pay money debts before default sets in. The basic goal of this
rule is that debtors indeed pay on time. The underlying assumption
probably is that business trust and thus economic growth is opti-
mally enhanced if all debtors pay on time rather than default on their
promises.4 The rule is enforced by means of several remedies, the
one sticking out being the accessory obligation to pay a statutory
interest rate. With regard to this remedy the European legislature
recently applied the following reasoning:
• Research shows that some 35% of the cases of late payment of
money debts concern deliberate omission to pay on time;
• This is a hurdle for interstate commerce within the European
Union (problem);
• Therefore, policy should be aimed at reducing deliberate late
payment (policy goal) by giving an incentive to debtors to pay on
time (behavioural assumption of corporate sensitivity to financial
incentives);
• Late payment could be reduced by a high level of statutory inter-
est (possible remedy) and swift recovery procedures, because the
Swedish example seems to show good results in this respect
(evidence of efficacy of a solution);
• Therefore, an EC Directive should use this remedy. The resulting
Directive 2000/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in commer-
cial transactions provides that the statutory interest rate consists
of an ECB reference rate plus a margin of 7% and that recovery
procedure should be swift.5
So, from a theoretical perspective, the efficacy of the remedy of inter-
est payment could be measured by evaluating whether Directive
2000/35/EC did in fact help decrease the number of days of deferral
and increase the willingness to pay on time. If efficacy is disproved or
weak, alternative remedies such as more exemplary interest rates
might be considered.6
4. This ulterior goal seems to underlie practically most rules of contract law. On theory of
contract law, see, e.g., Smith 2004, p. 54 ff.
5. Note that the policy underpinning is not primarily concerned with compensating the
creditor. Here, compensation is merely a remedial means to an end. Contrastingly, Law
Commission 2004, p. 2 ff. stresses the compensatory function.
6. Cf. Carval 1995, p. 275 f., no. 248, referring to article 21 of the Loi Badinter (loi no 85-677 du
5 juillet 1985), which states that the liability insurer’s delay in prompt payment within two
months increases the interest rate with 50% (and with a 100% after four months!).
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At this point, some underlying assumptions need further clarification.
If we want to evaluate the efficacy of substantive rules we need to have
a frame of reference, a yardstick, by which we can measure efficacy.
Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective efficacy can only be evalu-
ated if the underlying goals of the rules are clear-cut. In the law of
contract and tort, these goals are sometimes difficult to identify. Ask
ten scholars what the aim is of the right to terminate a contract after
the counterpart has not performed in conformity with the contract, or
what the goals of tortious liability for accidental injury are. You will
probably end up with more than ten possible answers and less than
one straight answer. The debate that follows with these ten scholars can
easily stand in the way of fruitful discussion on efficacy, because with-
out agreement on the goals of specific substantive rules there is no
yardstick with which to measure efficacy.7
With regard to underlying assumptions, let me first admit that the
underlying assumption of the following is that rules in private law
have discernable goals which cannot merely be of a corrective
nature. Correctiveness by definition implies making right the wrong
after it has happened; it is inherently backward looking.8
Surely, there must be more to private law than just looking back. My
admittedly rather simplistic approach to private law is that most
rules are made with a distinction in mind – sometimes explicit and
sometimes left implicit – between right behaviour and wrong behav-
iour. What is considered right should be encouraged and what is
wrong should be discouraged. This simple distinction is the basis for
most rules governing human and corporate behaviour in private law.
From this distinction, whatever the theory of law that underpins it,
usually follows that wrong behaviour is counterbalanced by a legal
remedy for the benefit of interested parties.9
7. This does not preclude an evaluation of the rule on the basis of some external paradigm
such as a law and economics analysis (e.g., efficiency).
8. Cf. Collins 1999, p. 256.
9. Cf., in a similar vein, Courage v. Crehan, C-453/99, judgement of the Court of Justice of
20 September 2001, paragraphs 26 and 27. See also EU Commission 2005, p. 4. 
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Assuming that this approach is in essence correct,10 what then do we
know about the efficacy of the remedy with regard to the aforemen-
tioned encouragement or discouragement? In my view, the yardstick
by which to measure a remedy is whether and to what extent it adds
to compliance with the substantive rule. Imagine a specific rule, stat-
ing that one should not display certain behaviour. My assumption
here would be that compliance with the rule is the primary concern
of the rule maker. It is sometimes argued that the classical approach
of the common law to performance in contract is an example which
invalidates this view. This approach holds that if a debtor in contract
does not perform, the creditor does not have a right to specific per-
formance but can merely claim damages. My analysis of such a rule
– if it does indeed (still) exist – is that it is not the non-performance
that the law holds to be wrong, but rather the non-performance with-
out offering and paying full compensation to the creditor.11
To conclude, my assumption is that compliance with the substantive
rule is the primary object of the rule itself. In private law, compliance
is secured by means of remedies. So, in my definition efficacy of
enforcement of substantive private law rules depends on the availability
of a remedy and how it is used in practice. Thus, a remedy ensuring
maximum compliance in theory, which is hardly used in practice (for
whatever reason) lacks efficacy12 and should be replaced or sup-
ported by ancillary remedies.
Note that the aforementioned assumption does not concern itself
with efficiency (i.e., the societal optimum of compliance and enforce-
ment). Efficacy alludes to the goals set by the rule maker, and unless
clear evidence to the contrary is available I work from the assump-
tion that efficacy strongly resembles full compliance. Indeed,
throughout this lecture I set out from the assumption that substan-
tive rules of private law (be it court made rules or legislative rules)
are to be fully enforced and complied with to a maximum in order to
achieve full efficacy.
The previous is by no means uncontested. It reflects a predominantly
instrumental approach to contract law and tort law. Those who con-
sider remedies as values in their own right and who think of private
law rights and remedies as having ‘self-referent qualities’,13 will not
10. Note that the argument mainly relates to behaviour-related rules of contract and tort law,
and not to, e.g., strict liability .
11. On the nature of remedies in contract in this respect, see, e.g., Smith 2004, p. 388 ff. An
example of a rule in tort law that transposes the substantive rule of conduct into (merely)
a rule of compensation is offered by article 6:168 of the Dutch Civil Code, stating that the
civil court can dismiss a claim for injunctive relief on the basis of the overriding needs of
society, provided that compensation of the ongoing wrongdoing is secured. 
12. This builds on the assumption that increasing the probability of ‘conviction’ provides a
true incentive for compliance. Seminal Becker 1968, p. 176. Cf. Wagner 2006a, p. 377.
13. On that approach, see Collins 1999, p. 37 ff. (‘self reference and closure’), p. 56 ff. 
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adhere to this approach. Moreover, there is the practical obstacle
mentioned earlier that the goals of private law rules are sometimes
difficult to detect,14 rendering assessment of efficacy extremely diffi-
cult.15 In this paper, I do not intend to convince the sceptics. Instead,
I build on the aforementioned views.
Obviously, some rules in contract and tort law are easier to define in
terms of goals than others. In the following I will state what I consider
to be the goal(s) of the rule at hand; if necessary an assumption will be
made on the goals. Furthermore, my analysis is limited to situations in
which at least one of the parties concerned is a professional, corporate
player. In other words: my focus is on corporate respondents.16 Build-
ing on this, I set out to analyse a number of rules and remedies in
contract and tort law that I feel are in need of recalibration given the
goals of substantive rules.
As a final introductory remark – the analysis offered here is not lim-
ited to a specific European jurisdiction. Rather, I aspire to give an over-
view that may be of relevance to several legal systems. Therefore, I will
not dwell on details of specific legal systems. As a result, the analysis
provided may not fully apply to all legal systems simply because the
legal systems do not fully converge in detail. I do believe, however, that
the exercise may prove a fruitful jumping board for further research on
a more national level.
14. Note, however, that modern private law legislation increasingly pays attention to formu-
lating the goals of the substantive rules and remedies. This usually is part of the explana-
tory memorandum, but it can also be part of the text of the rule itself. For instance, article
46 of the TRIPS Agreement (i.e., the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights) stipulates: “In order to create an effective deterrent to infringe-
ment, the judicial authorities shall have the authority to order that goods that they have
found to be infringing be (...) disposed of outside the channels of commerce (...).”
15. Cf. Collins 1999, p. 81 f.
16. Elsewhere (Van Boom 2003) I have put forward the reasons for this focus on corporate
behaviour. In short, I believe that private law is likely to have more impact on (repeat) cor-
porate behaviour compared to individual behaviour. Therefore, the more private law rules
focus on corporate behaviour the more likely they will actually be effective.
ELL5.book  Page 11  Wednesday, October 18, 2006  10:30 AM
12 Willem H. van Boom
2 Features and problem areas
2.1 Three features
What do the laws of contract and tort offer by means of remedies?
Roughly speaking the remedies usually employed in European legal
systems are the following:
• nullifying the contract that was concluded under material influence
of mistake, misrepresentation, duress or undue influence;
• withdrawal from the contract in case of non-performance;
• compensation for damage suffered as a consequence of imputable
non-performance of the contract;
• compensation for damage caused by imputable wrongful acts and
omissions or events for which strict liability exists.
Three prominent features of the law of remedies will be introduced
here, because these features play an important role in the following
sections.
First, there is the post-facto feature. The remedies listed above tend to
focus on remedying a wrong that has already materialized.17 The under-
lying presumption may well be that by thus enforcing the substantive
rules behind the remedy, justice will be done to the party invoking the
remedy and in the process his detrimental position is more or less put
right. As a result, the post-facto feature seems to indicate that the law is
more concerned with putting right the wrong rather than actually pre-
venting the wrong. However, sometimes putting right the wrong after
the event is assumed to have some sort of specific or general deterrent
effect.18 We will come back to this assumption later on.
The second characteristic is the restoration feature. By focussing on
putting right the wrong, the law tries to put the injured party as much
as possible in the position that he would have been in, had the wrong
not been committed. This perspective has led to an ever more refined
system aimed at virtually turning back the clock: by reinstating prop-
erty rights with retroactive effect, by giving claims for restoration, by
repairing the defective goods, and by compensating lost profits and
17. Cf. Ogus 1994, p. 261: “The passive and residual nature of the legal control – action is
taken by the courts only after the ‘event’ and only at the initiative of the harmed party –
limits its effectiveness.”
18. Cf. Lindblom 1997, p. 809, stating that “civil procedure aims mainly at retrospective con-
flict resolution and compensation (reparation) at the individual level, and at prospective
behavior modification (prevention), through deterrence and moral building, at the gen-
eral level.”
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other future benefits that would have accrued if the breach of contract
or tort had not been committed. In tort law, this restoration feature is
usually dubbed the paradigm of full compensation (restitutio in integrum),
but the underlying principle can be recognized in contract law rules as
well. The claimant is entitled to be brought in the position in which he
would have been but for the wrongful act. The mirror image is that the
other party will not have to restore more than what was lost: the restora-
tion feature in principle does not allow either a duty to pay punitive
damages or a duty to disgorge profits obtained from the wrongful act.
Disgorgement of profits exceeding the damage suffered is some-
times allowed in specific legislation or with regard to specific wrong-
ful behaviour (e.g., in some jurisdictions in case of intellectual
property infringement or in case of unfair trade practices).19 Punitive
damages as such, however, are virtually non-existent on the Euro-
pean continent. Although the concept is known in the common law
(under the heading of ‘exemplary damages’) its ambit and practical
use is limited.20 Note, however, that under specific circumstances
some remedies can mimic punitive damages.21 Some jurisdictions
for instance find the degree of fault of the liable person (negligent or
intentional wrongdoing) relevant for the calculation of the award for
non-pecuniary loss, thus allowing a punitive element to enter the law
of damages. Notably, the sums paid in non-pecuniary loss in cases
of press liability seem to serve a deterrence goal.22
The third feature is closely linked – or at least, historically so – to the
previous two: the specificity feature. Private law remedies are aimed at
providing redress in a specific case, to a specific claimant, fitted to his
purposes, to do justice to his case and the factual circumstances that
regard him. Courts obviously consider it to be their task to adjudicate
rights and duties to the parties present in the procedure instead of
delivering broadly phrased decisions that may surpass the interests
implicated in the procedure. Specificity in principle implies that
enforcement is dependent on private parties instigating claims.
19. See, e.g., article 13 Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual
property rights Cf. § 9-10 Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb UWG (Germany). Cf. Van
Boom and Wissink 2002, p. 73 ff. See also McKendrick 2003, p. 93 ff.
20. See The Law Commission 1997, p. 1 ff. Cf. Bolt and Lensing 1993, p. 48 ff.; Lindenbergh
1998, p. 23 ff.; Mulheron 2004, p. 75.
21. On punitive private law, see, e.g., Dreier 2002, p. 515 ff.
22. Cf. Verheij 2002, p. 412 f. Note that in some jurisdictions which tend to award small sums in
case of liability of entertainment media, there is a growing call for a more punitive stance of
the judiciary. See, e.g., Harinxma thoe Slooten 2006, p. 225 ff. and Wagner 2006a, p. 462 f.
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Admittedly, some (higher) courts do consider it to be their task to
take the specific case to a more abstract level and to regulate society
on the basis of the specific case, by taking directorship of legal inno-
vation and adjusting the law to new and upcoming societal needs
where the legislator remains inactive. In this respect, e.g, the Ger-
man Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Bundesgerichtshof seem to
be among the most active of European supreme (civil) courts.
Nevertheless, my impression is that courts predominantly tend to
confine their rulings to the specific case at hand and reserve the right
to adjust their next ruling to the specific case at hand, e.g., by using
general phrases as “in cases such as these”, “this rule applies in
principle to...” et cetera. This reserve is understandable given the
inability of courts to consider the full consequence of their decisions
in future cases.23
Obviously, the post-facto feature, the restoration feature and the specifi-
city feature do not necessarily converge nor do they necessarily come
about simultaneously. There may even be other relevant features. There
is, however, good reason to focus on the three features mentioned here:
in certain cases they seem to constitute a major impediment to effica-
cious enforcement of private law. In the next paragraphs, I will give
three examples of possible problem areas.
2.2 Example: preventing death and injury
With regard to liability for death and personal injury, my assumption is
that the primary goal of liability is to prevent wrongful harm from
occurring. In practice, however, the law’s focus is on compensating
damage after the event. Some authors even go so far as to state that
tortious liability can only exist by grace of the accident: without damage
there is no tortious liability, they argue.24 This, however, does not hold
true if we consider the duty to act diligently (i.e., with due regard to the
interests of the potential victim) to be the pivotal concept in tort law and
not the damage itself. The duty to act diligently in view of the potential
harm to others logically precedes the liability to compensate those
others. Therefore, tort law must either aspire to help preventing wrongs
or surrender this task to other instruments of behaviour modification.25
23. Cf. Collins 1999, p. 73 f. See also Kaplow 1992, p. 612 f.
24. Cane 2002, p. 429 ff., 434 f. Contra: Collins 1999, p. 42.
25. I realise that from a historical point of view in some jurisdictions there may be much to be
said for the distinction between remedies in contract and tort law (i.e., damages) and proce-
dural remedies (sc., in equity, e.g., injunction, court order, et cetera). Working from this
particular distinction, the idea that tortious liability is non-existent if no damage has
occurred may not seem anomalous. Cf. Wightman 1999, p. 271 ff.; Rogers 2002, p. 796.
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In tort, duties work from the idea that people are obliged to act
according to a certain standard in order to prevent others from suc-
cumbing to death and injury, property damage or some form of pure
economic loss. The substantive rules can be supposed to be set at an
efficient level either by the legislator or the courts. With respect to
courts one can sometimes doubt whether the rules are indeed set with
full compliance in mind or merely with compensation of the sustained
injuries in mind. My assumption here – and the powerful phrasing
with which courts tend to condemn wrongful corporate behaviour of
the plaintiff seems to support this assumption – is that the standards
set by the law are in fact supposed to be fully complied with.
Negligent or malicious failure to exercise the duty to act diligently is
remedied with a claim for compensation in tort. In this respect, the
remedy of full compensation is the tool by which legal systems try to
achieve the primary aim of preventing and the secondary aim of
compensating undesired externalities.26
Claims in tort are by nature accidental: they are usually filed by indi-
viduals that have actually been harmed by the wrongful act at hand. The
mere risk that precedes the materialization hardly ever seems to be liti-
gated in a civil court, neither in a procedure concerning an injunctive
order nor by means of a declaratory judgement. Thus, if an employer’s
negligence compromises workshop safety standards a certain risk of
occupational injury is created. The wrongful behaviour of the employer
as such, however, is usually only debated in a civil court if the risk
indeed materializes and kills or maims. It is only then that, with the use
of the post-facto feature and the restoration feature, the court addresses
the question whether the employer had in fact acted diligently and rea-
sonably at the time of the accident.27
To my knowledge, courts are rarely invited before an accident occurs to
judge whether the risk of personal injury is the produce of some negli-
gent act.28 Actually reducing the risk of death and personal injury by
forcing corporations to comply with safety and health standards ex ante
is usually considered to be the domain of public agencies such as occu-
pational health and safety agencies, public health authorities, food agen-
cies et cetera.29 So, notwithstanding the lip service paid by tort law to
26. On these objectives (and their extent and hierarchy), see, e.g., Schäfer and Ott 2004,
p. 107 ff. Cf. Van Boom 2006 (forthcoming).
27. Note that in some jurisdictions employers’ liability is excluded in principle and replaced
by compulsory social security compensation. The essence of the problem arises in prod-
ucts liability cases as well.
28. There are, however, examples of court cases in which declaratory judgement is sought after
exposure to a source of potential damage with long latency. 
29. Seminal with regard to this dichotomy is Shavell 1984, p. 357 ff.
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deterrence goals, this field of private law, to my knowledge, is hardly ever
truly used as a direct instrument of risk reduction before the event.30
2.3 Example: breach of information duties
Both in the general law of contracts and more specifically in consumer
contract law, there are a number of general or specific duties to provide
the other party with information held to be crucial or highly relevant to
his decision to enter into the contract. Contract law offers a number of
remedies in cases where the information is not given.
By withholding the information, sometimes the contract can be said
to be concluded under the influence of mistake, misrepresentation et
cetera. Usually, invoking this rule ends the contract with some sort of
retroactive effect (nullification, rescission et cetera). The restoration
feature will usually lead to the full restoration of the status quo ante.31
In other cases the withholding of information is remedied by the pro-
longation of a waiting period of some sort (viz., a cooling off period).32
Sometimes, information duties in contract are remedied by the right to
compensation of the damage suffered by entering into the contract.
When a physician is under the duty to inform the patients of the risks
inherent to the proposed treatment, he will be liable to compensate the
patient if he fails to secure informed consent from the patient. In prin-
ciple, however, the available remedy of damages only grants compensa-
tion if the lack of information caused detriment. Hence, if the patient’s
decision would not have been different if the information had been
given or if the patient cannot prove he would have made a drastically
different decision, usually the remedy of damages will not grant
redress. So in effect, the law says: yes, there is a wrongful omission, but
no, there is no damage, and that’s where legal remedies end.33
30. With regard to the common law, there is the historical explanation that injunctive relief
(as is specific performance) is not available as a claimant’s right but merely as a discre-
tionary power of the court. On discretion, see, e.g., Zakrzewski 2005, p. 85 ff.
31. In this respect it has been argued that private law cannot but provide “second best reme-
dies” that will hardly encourage markets to move toward information disclusore.
Cf. Schwartz and Wilde 1979, p. 679.
32. Cf. Rekaiti and Van den Bergh 2000, p. 371 ff.
33. Possibly the restoration feature does necessitate the undoing of legal effects of contracts
concluded without essential information available (mistake etc.), but the decision itself
and its factual consequences cannot always be redressed efficaciously.
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A similar problem was dealt with in the well known European Court
of Justice case of Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nor-
drhein-Westfalen.34 This gender discrimination case concerned Direc-
tive 76/207/EEC (equal treatment) and the question was – from a
European law perspective – what private law remedy the Directive
necessitated. The Directive was in fact silent on this point, so, in
principle the member states were free to choose between different
remedies. The ECJ ruled, however, that if a member state chooses
the remedy of compensation for damage, “then in order to ensure
that it is effective and that it has a deterrent effect, that compensa-
tion must in any event be adequate in relation to the damage sus-
tained and must therefore amount to more than purely nominal
compensation such as, for example, the reimbursement only of the
expenses incurred in connection with the application.”35
2.4 Example: trifle damage
In society, every individual is faced with minor shortcomings of part-
ners in contract. Examples abound. A newspaper is late once a week; a
telephone service invoice has been rounded with a few cents to the
detriment of the consumer; energy suppliers inadvertently use rights of
automatic debit even after clients have terminated the contract; a major
company unilaterally postpones payment of its creditors with a few
days, et cetera.36 A health insurance company charges everyone of its
clients € 7,50 per annum too much, in violation of a statutory pricing
scheme.37
Each of these minor failures to perform in accordance with the con-
tract usually causes trifle damage which is too insignificant to justify
commencing civil proceedings. A simple phone call usually is enough
to correct the wrong. Usually, though, and not always. Moreover, not all
clients are aware of the non-performance. Conversely, the damage to
society as a whole or a specific group within society (clients, sharehold-
ers, et cetera) can be substantial, and the flip side of trifle damage thus
may well be an aggregate profit of considerable size for the wrongdoer.
34. ECJ 10 April 1984, Case 14/83, ECR [1984] 1891.
35. On the dogmatic problems that the case presented under German law, see, e.g., Brügge-
meier 1999, p. 171 ff. and Wagner 2006a, p. 389 ff.
36. More examples are given by Schaefer 2000, p. 185. Cf. Asser et al. 2003, p. 175 and Tzan-
kova 2005, p. 17 ff. See also Micklitz and Stadler 2003a, p. 10 ff. 
37. The example is based on a Dutch case; see Hoge Raad 2 September 1994, Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie 1995, 369. 
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A specific problematic example of trifle damage concerns certain
infringements of competition law. Price fixing for instance may cause
economic harm, e.g. in the sense of decreasing consumer surplus.
Assessing the extent of this harm is problematic, identifying the vic-
tims even more so. As we will see later on, some attempts have been
made to empower consumers to pursue injunctive relief and profit
disgorgement.
3 Causes and why to address them
3.1 Rule, goal, instrument, efficacy
As stated earlier, before we can assume that in some aspects private law
is in a state of inefficacious enforcement we first have to make a rough
assessment of the goals of the various contract and tort law remedies.
Then we can more or less judge whether these goals are in fact effica-
ciously served by the remedies and their practical use. So what ís the
purpose of remedies? Although there is no firm agreement among
private law theorists and philosophers, I feel that a number of recur-
ring underpinnings of remedies in contract and tort can be distin-
guished:
• doing justice to a wronged individual;
• providing a disincentive to the wrongdoer and others tempted to
commit similar wrongs;
• reinstating the wronged individual into the position he would have
been in without the wrong.
Although surely this enumeration of goals is an oversimplification, and
other corollary goals can be distinguished (such as cost spreading in case
of compensation), in essence the goals mentioned are generally assumed
to be the main goals of remedies in contract and tort. Working from that
assumption, a rough assessment can be made of the efficacy of the
current private law remedies in light of the three prominent features we
dealt with in § 2.1. To engage in this assessment, the next three para-
graphs will focus on three relevant obstacles in relation to the three
mentioned features.
3.2 The post-facto feature and ownership of the problem
The idea of ownership of a problem alludes to a specific consequence of the
private law paradigm of autonomy, namely that where individuals do not
feel the urge or lack the resources to go to court and exercise their private
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law rights, there is effectively no private enforcement either.38 In some
parts of private law this seems to strongly amplify the post-facto feature.
For instance, tortious liability for accidental death and injury seems very
much based on the post-facto feature. Victims usually do not own the
problem until after the risk materializes and strikes them. Potential
victims rely on manufacturers to carefully contemplate the design and
production of the product, on employers to contemplate the safety of the
working process, and on owners of premises to ensure safety of the
structure. Only after wrongful omission by the manufacturer, employer
or owner has in fact caused injury, will private law concern itself with the
question whether the injury should have been prevented.
Even after the event, the victim cannot be said to be concerned in
legal terms with preventing the accident from reoccurring: in legal
terms, his concern is the financial compensation of his own injuries.
This may seem obvious to the legal practitioner, but the effect is none-
theless that private law remedies in cases like these are not truly called in
for preventive goals but first and foremost for compensatory goals. Fur-
thermore, it is not so obvious to the lay man. Research shows that the
motives of victims of personal injury to claim damages are not exclus-
ively financial: the victim may well want to ensure that similar accidents
will not happen again to others.39 In this respect claiming compensation
may not have a bearing on the prevention of (future) wrongdoing.
There are several drawbacks concerning the post-facto feature.
In short, the post-facto feature concentrates on restoring after the event,
not on installing safeguards to prevent the accident from happening
again.40 This flies in the face of the goal of prevention. First, it may not
adequately satisfy the needs of those motivated to use contract and tort
remedies with specific deterrence objectives in mind. Second, the post-
facto feature hardly ever focuses on monitoring behaviour after the court
decision. In essence, court decisions tend to be financially oriented.
Therefore, the risk itself may materialize again if the post-facto feature is
employed. Whether or not it actually will, depends, inter alia, on the
deterrence value of the post-facto compensation in the specific case.41 So,
it is the deterrent effect – often presumed rather than proved – of the
38. Cf. Collins 1999, p. 69.
39. See, e.g., Genn 1999, p. 179 ff., Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum
(WODC), Ministerie van Justitie 2004, p. 142.
40. Cf. Shavell 1993, p. 258; Shavell 2004, p. 585 f.
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post-facto remedy that seems decisive for the efficacy with regard to the
goal of accident prevention and reduction. Third, the longer the lapse of
time between the act or omission and the remedy, the weaker the preven-
tive effect can be expected to be.42 This dilution of incentives as a result of
long latency seems plausible with regard to corporate behaviour: corpo-
rate policy may have evolved after the act or omission, scientific or social
insights may already have changed over time, et cetera.43
Furthermore, the post-facto feature combined with vague standards
of substantive law rather than clear cut rules may cause uncertainty ex
ante with regard to the appropriate line of behaviour.44 This uncertainty
may account for both unnecessary defensive behaviour and undesir-
able negligent behaviour.45
To conclude, the post-facto feature may not be efficacious in reaching
the goals of the substantive rule. It may lack specific deterrence value if
the court decision is not followed by some monitoring activity, it may
lack general deterrence value in cases of long latency, and it may fuel
the wrong level of care.46
3.3 Causation, damage, and the restoration feature
Another potential obstacle to efficacious enforcement of a more funda-
mental nature seems to be an inherent trait of many legal systems: the
law of damages.
Restoration presupposes proof that something has in fact been lost.
In this respect the causation requirement is known to be a serious
threshold for any claimant to succeed in claiming. There are good rea-
sons for this formidable threshold. The causation requirement as such is
the legal fence between compensation of the truly injured and overcom-
pensation of the randomly selected. However, in practice, where science
has increasingly shown correlative relationships between agent and
effect, the law usually demanded concrete chains of causation – it asked
41. Admittedly, whether the accident will happen again may depend on numerous, largely
non-legal factors (sc. corporate culture, internal corporate structure, state of the relevant
market, et cetera). 
42. Cf. Koch 1998, p. 806.
43. On long latency and the problems it poses in tort and insurance law, see, with further ref-
erences, Faure 2003, p. 46 ff.
44. Cf. Collins 1999, p. 266 ff; Shavell 1993, p. 264. On the advantages and disadvantages of
standards and rules in this respect, see Kaplow 1992, p. 557 ff., p. 622; cf. Ulen 1999,
p. 340 ff.
45. See, e.g., Kolstad et al. 1990, p. 894 f.; Miceli 1997, p. 45.
46. Note that I use ‘may’ to underline the hypothetical rather than the factual character of
these assertions.
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itself the question whether in the concrete case causation is more proba-
ble than not. Originally, most legal systems did not consider a 33 %
increased risk of cancer due to some agent to be a head of damage in its
own right.
An increasing number of legal systems has, however, opened the
possibility of claiming a proportionate part of damage that can never
be proved to be (solely) caused by a specific agent. For instance,
whereas lung cancer can be caused by smoking on the one hand,
asbestos dust exposure on the other, and synergetically so by a com-
bination of both causes, it is impossible to prove what caused a spe-
cific case of lung cancer in a smoking asbestos worker. Courts have
shown to be willing to rule in favour of these workers by awarding a
proportional compensation.47
The battle over acknowledgement of increased risks of damage and loss
of a chance as heads of damage in their own right is ongoing.48 The
focal point here is that the classic remedy of compensation is only avail-
able to those who can prove damage and causation in their specific case.
That feature is worthwhile in theory, but in practice it may leave deserv-
ing cases – e.g., cases in which damage and causation are plausible on
a more statistical level but hard to substantiate in a concrete case –
without remedy.49
Leaving deserving claimants without compensation as a conse-
quence of obstacles in substantive or procedural rules may give rise to a
state of inefficacy. An underexposed area in which this may be the case
relates to pure economic loss in which either damage or causation is
difficult to prove in the concrete sense but nevertheless seems plaus-
ible on a more abstract level. For this reason, compensation for unlaw-
ful restriction of competition (antitrust) may thus well be practically
nonexistent.
47. See, e.g., Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 31 March 2006, case C04/303 (proportionate
employer’s liability in case of lung cancer in case of smoking and asbestos dust expo-
sure). Cf. article 3:103 ff. of the Principles of European Tort Law (PETL) and EGTL 2005,
p. 49 ff. 
48. See, e.g., Wagner 2006b, p. A53 ff. 
49. Obviously, generally speaking the burden of proof can weigh heavily on deserving claim-
ants. Shifting the burden of proof in order to effectuate the substantive rule may be one of
the solutions. On that theme, e.g., Giesen 2001, p. 449 ff. Cf. Verheij 2002, p. 474.
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Take the example of a company entering a national market and being
confronted with suppliers reluctant to offer their goods to the new-
comer. With some luck the newcomer obtains evidence of colluding
competitors and an informal framework of vertical competition restric-
tion. The company may want to claim for compensation. However,
this type of illicit competition practices tends to influence turnover
and profits of the targeted company indirectly, and as a result a direct
causal link between business results and the wrongful acts is
extremely difficult to establish. Especially in the case of newly estab-
lished enterprises the courts will wisely not want to use a presump-
tion of causation, because this would greatly increase the chance of
compensating for the inherent risk of bankruptcy. The downside of
this reluctance is that it inevitably leaves deserving claimants without
compensation.
Another aspect of the restoration feature can easily lead to problems of
enforcement. Most legal systems are based on the overarching prin-
ciple that every case is unique and every claimant should have ‘his’
restitutio in integrum fitted to his case. As a consequence legal stan-
dards on the calculation of damages tend to be very rudimentary.
There are several drawbacks concerning the restoration feature.
As long as civil courts cherish the connectedness of enforcement and
restoration, some loopholes in enforcement may never be properly
addressed. First, there are the cases in which the damage requirement
and the causation requirement systematically oust deserving claims
from court. If we agree upon the assertion that unfair competition prac-
tices cause undesirable damage to individual competitors and if we
conclude on the basis of scientific evidence that some toxic agent severely
increases the number of statistical deaths among exposed populations,
then we should question why the restoration feature allows the law to
turn a blind eye to these cases.
Second, if restoration is to be an instrument of efficacious preven-
tion of wrongs, then we should consider using disgorgement of profits
more intensely than has been the case until now. The reticence to allow
disgorgement of profits seems to stem from the classical approach to
restoration: nothing more and nothing less than the claimant’s loss.
Efficacy may demand, however, that we shift the focus to the preventive
goals of private law rules rather than merely addressing the compensa-
tory function.
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Third, rudimentary standards on how to assess the right amount of ‘res-
titutio in integrum’ are beautiful in a dogmatic sense, but in a practical
sense they may turn out to be inefficacious. Parties negotiating a settle-
ment may have little concrete rules to fall back on, which may increase
the cost of reaching a settlement. Furthermore, without clear cut rules
on calculation of damages, one-shot players may suffer from serious
lack of information and settle for less than the substantive rule may
have to offer.50 Moreover, the consequence of flexible and open textured
private law values with regard to, e.g., calculating damages, may well be
that repeat players strategically protract settlement. In this respect, the
uninformed individual may be better off with clear-cut rules rather than
with open textured standards. In any event, making concrete rules of
restoration standards should be on the legislative agenda.51
3.4 Trifle damage and the specificity feature
Contract and tort law, based as they are on individual autonomy and
responsibility, usually go hand in hand with the paradigm of individual
access to justice. With regard to trifle damage this may be the cause of a
state of inefficacy. Whenever a wrong – either in contract or in tort –
gives rise to a dispersal of detriment to a great number of individuals
that are individually endowed with individual but uneconomically
viable claims, the specificity feature may lead to inefficacious enforce-
ment of the underlying private law values.52
What causes this state of affairs is the specificity feature which
encourages potential claimants to show ‘rational apathy’.53 The possible
benefits of claiming in case of trifle damage are outweighed by the cost
in terms of time, energy, and legal costs. Not claiming then seems the
rational thing to do. The result may be that substantive rules of private
law are not enforced at all by individuals,54 turning enforcement into
what economists would consider a ‘public good’.
50. I leave aside the cost of standardising the application of standards by means of analysing
and systemising court decisions (cost in the sense of scholars writing handbooks, courts
and law offices systematically ordering case law et cetera).
51. Trebilcock 2003, p. 86 f. rightly observes an analogy with ‘wholesale rather than retail’
compensation in workers’ compensation schemes.
52. Schaefer 2000, p. 185. Note, however, as a counterweight that non-deserving small claims
may have nuisance value for individuals. See, e.g., Lempert 1976, p. 183.
53. Landes and Posner 1975, p. 33; Schaefer 2000, p. 195. Cf. Howells and Weatherill 2005,
p. 604 f.; Picod and Davo 2005, p. 321. For empirical underpinning of the ‘apathy’, see,
e.g., Genn 1999, p. 67 ff. Note that the extent of the ‘apathy’ in part depends on financial
arrangements concerning legal aid, litigation fees and civil procedure cost allocation.
Cf. Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid 2002, p. 205 ff.
54. Cf. Duggan 2003, p. 48 ff; Frenk 1994, p. 286.
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There are several drawbacks concerning the specificity feature.
Specificity relies on specific claimants to instigate a claim. The net effect
of these individual claims on corporate behaviour may be substantial,
but may also turn out to be insignificant. Imagine for instance a retail
chain of consumer electronics sellers using onerous general clauses. If a
specific consumer is faced with these clauses he may successfully con-
test the invocability of the clauses. However, he will typically not request
an injunction restraining the seller from using similar clauses in future
transactions with other consumers. As a result, the onerous clauses
remain in circulation, thus sustaining illicit practices with regard to
other, less informed or persistent consumers.55 This is typical for the
specificity feature in contract and tort: the individual has been helped,
but society as a whole may be left untouched. A more efficacious instru-
ment of enforcement of the underlying private law values – although
not necessarily a perfect one – would be an ex ante evaluation of clauses
either by a government agency or private interest group or a procedure
facilitating forced erasure of the clauses altogether.56
E.g., in France the governmental commission des clauses abusives can
recommend erasing or adjusting onerous clauses. Although the
commission does not have regulatory powers, it can publish its find-
ings and it has some informal influence over courts and legislature.57
Authorized consumer interest groups are allowed to request injunc-
tive relief.58 In the United Kingdom, the Unfair Contract Terms Unit
of the OFT has a supervisory role, can investigate on complaint and
negotiate or enforce compliance. The OFT is a so-called “general
enforcer” with regard to Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair
terms in consumer contracts.59 Indeed, article 7 of the Directive provides
that the member states ensure that ‘adequate and effective means
exist to prevent the continued use’ of onerous general clauses.60
55. Collins 1999, p. 233. Cf. Beale 1995, p. 254. See also the example mentioned by Mölen-
berg 2002, p. 86.
56. Cf. Beale 1995, p. 251 ff.; Bradgate 1999, p. 29. On this problem, see also European Com-
mission 2000a, p. 20 ff.
57. Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz 2003, p. 208 f., no. 185; no. 548. Moreover, authorised con-
sumer interest groups can instigate an ‘action civile’; Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz 2003,
p. 597 ff., no. 556 ff.
58. Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz 2003, p. 211 ff., no. 188.
59. Howells and Weatherill 2005, p. 597.
60. See Weatherill 2005, p. 126.
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It can be argued that specificity tends to ignore the bigger picture and
may thus be merely fighting symptoms rather than curing the disease.
Essentially, the question arises whether private law should concern
itself with ‘curing the disease’. Is this not a matter of ‘public goods’ that
should be generated by public law? I will turn to this matter shortly. For
now, suffice to say that I think private law will only be able to produce
this ‘public good’ if it abandons the specificity feature, and second, I
feel that it should do so at least in areas of private law in which public
enforcement is in a state of underdevelopment or in an obvious need of
ancillary enforcement efforts.
3.5 Rough analysis
At first sight, the three obstacles that may stand in the way of effica-
cious enforcement, seem unrelated. On a more abstract level, however,
they do have two qualities in common. First, all three obstacles either
potentially frustrate the underlying goals of contract and tort law rules
or bring about a state of less than full enforcement of these rules.
Second, all three obstacles are caused by or amplified by fundamental
features of private law.
Admittedly, it is quite difficult to empirically measure inefficacy of
enforcement.
The first shared quality necessarily refers to an empirical underpin-
ning that is difficult to provide. Both sub-optimal, optimal, and
excessive enforcement are difficult to measure, even if – as we
assumed at the beginning – the yardstick is full compliance in
accordance with the aims of substantive law. From a theoretical
angle, any remedy can only effectively serve the goal of deterrence if
the remedy does in fact deter from non-compliance. In practice, it is
extremely difficult to test the empirical underpinning of this assump-
tion and thus to establish firm evidence on the efficacy of the law of
remedies.61
Furthermore, prerequisite to assessing efficacy is factual information
on the actual level of compliance; perhaps the substantive rule is fully
complied with voluntarily (or for whatever other reason) and enforce-
ment is not needed. In some instances, however, there is more firm
evidence that, e.g., the post-facto feature does not build efficacious
instruments of enforcement. In this paper, I will not present a detailed
61. Cf. Cane 2002a, p. 306.
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argument on the need of interdisciplinary research to ascertain efficacy
and inefficacy. I will work with the available, admittedly sketchy mate-
rial.
For now, I suggest that we work from the assumption that inefficacy
arises as soon as there are strong indications that the goals of the sub-
stantive rule are not met by the available and commonly addressed
remedies and enforcement of the rule is structurally hampered by any
of the following three reasons:
• The post-facto feature may result in too much or too little precau-
tion to prevent wrongs (also referred to as underdeterrence or over-
deterrence).
• The restoration feature presents obstacles to the claimant: the proof
of damage and causation are typically too difficult to deliver, and as
a result claims are not brought to court.
• The specificity feature may constitute an obstacle to recovering or
stopping trifle damage.
4 Restoring routes to efficacy of private law 
enforcement
4.1 Counterweights outside the private law domain
In economic theory some of the problems we have identified so far, are
in some respects connected to the phenomenon of ‘public goods’.62
Theory holds that public goods need to be generated by public law and
some kind of public enforcement.63 And indeed, the three examples
presented in § 2 seem to be the subject of some sort of public enforce-
ment scheme.
First, with regard to preventing death and injury – the example given in
§ 2.2 – we can surmise that those are the ultimate goals of institutions
such as occupational health and safety agencies, food safety agencies,
local authority supervisors on building activity, quality controls in
health care, et cetera.
62. On ‘public goods’, see, e.g., Stiglitz 2000, p. 127 ff.; Parsons 1995, p. 207 ff.
63. Cf. Collins 1999, p. 75 f. In this respect, one might prophesise that civil law is evolving
into public law (in this vein, see Lindblom 1997, p. 819). See also, with further references,
Wagner 2006a, p. 422 ff.
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Public law instruments such as regulatory permits, criminal prosecu-
tion, disciplinary boards, administrative penalties, as well as forced clo-
sure of business, witholding professional license, are usually employed
to enforce rules aimed at prevention of wrongs. So, there are myriad
public enforcement efforts with goals similar to those of private law
institutions. The difference between private and public enforcement in
this respect is that private enforcement usually works from the post-
facto feature whereas public enforcement seems more focussed on ex
ante enforcement.
Indeed, private law remedies are sometimes intended to be a mere
ancillary instrument for sustaining public law enforcement efforts.
For instance, ‘public good’ rules on European product quality are pri-
marily enforced by means of public law but are also ‘backed up’ by
private enforcement efforts such as competitors’ claims for damage
and injunctive relief.64 Equally, a private law right to compensation
can serve as a deliberate policy instrument of strengthening public
policy goals.65 Admittedly, in the areas where private law remedies
are ancillary to public law remedies, the levels of both enforcement
systems somehow have to be balanced. For instance, there does not
seem to be a need for treble damage under a private law enforce-
ment system in competition law infringements if the public prosecu-
tion of such cases is maximal and the fines are extremely high.66
Unsurprisingly, it is sometimes argued that as a result of the clear and
concrete rules it is based on, public law regulation is more apt for
monitoring and recurring enforcement effort rather than the one-off
event of a claim for compensation in private law proceedings. Further-
more, whereas substantive contract and tort law rules have proved valu-
able because of their generality and flexibility, these features are
increasingly thought of as lacking the focus and concreteness that a
regulatory purposive approach needs.67 This may lead some to argue
64. ECJ 17 September 2002, Case C-253/00, ECR [2002] I-7289 (Antonio Muñoz y Cia SA and
Superior Fruiticola SA v Frumar Ltd and Redbridge Produce Marketing Ltd.); cf. Wagner
2006a, p. 414 f. 
65. See also ECJ 20 September 2001, Case C-453/99, ECR [2001] I-6297 (Courage Ltd. v Bern-
hard Crehan). On that case, see, e.g., Komninos 2002, p. 460 ff.; Jones and Beard 2002,
p. 246 ff.; Odudu and Edelman 2002, p. 327 ff.; Monti 2002, p. 282 ff.; Wagner 2006a,
p. 402 ff.
66. Cf. Baker 2004, p. 382 ff. Moreover, treble damages may not even always fully compensate
the true damage suffered by the injured competitors (e.g., because the legal system at
hand does not allow for prejudgement interest!); cf. Jones 2003, p. 102 ff.
67. On these perceptions, see, e.g., Collins 1999, p. 55.
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that private law – notably tort law – can merely play a subsidiary role in
prevention of wrongs and that true prevention can only be achieved
with public regulation.68 On the other hand, however, there are those
stressing the need for the joint use of public law regulation and private
law because of their respective inherent restraints.69
The second example with which we dealt in § 2.3, information duties
and their enforcement, is increasingly the ‘natural habitat’ of regulatory
agencies. For example, with regard to information duties in financial
services contracts, within a decade or so we have experienced a shift
from regulation by means of private law arrangements (either in the
form of simple contract court cases or a more sophisticated set of rules,
private codes of conduct, et cetera) towards a more government-driven
regulatory state of affairs. Although in substance still the domain of
private contract law, information duties are experiencing a wave of
public regulation of ever increasing precision and detail. This is not
only the case in financial services (banking, investment business,
insurance, et cetera), but also in consumer sales and credit transac-
tions. Transparency through dissemination of information is used in
oligopolistic markets and former public utility markets to the same
end. Enforcement of these pseudo-public information duties is picked
up by new and old agencies: Consumer Authorities, Financial Markets
Authorities, Banking Authorities, Energy Authorities et cetera. Instru-
ments of enforcement include retraction of permits and administrative
fines.
At the core of these developments is the idea that a claim in contract
may be the least efficacious instrument to secure compliance. A party
that is damaged by the fact he did not receive relevant information
before concluding a contract, can try to dissolve the contract or claim
for damages. In both cases, courts are bound to apply the restoration
feature – together with the specificity feature – which forces them to
assess to the best of their abilities what the situation would have been if
there had not been wrongful contracting behaviour, mistake or misrep-
resentation.
The process can generate very dissimilar outcomes. Moreover, the
damage can only be restored in the financial sense, and in practice
there is no guarantee of full compensation. This has been shown by
68. On this debate, see, e.g., the contributions of M. Faure and A. Ogus, to: Van Boom, Kissling
and Lukas (forthcoming). 
69. Cf. Shavell 1984, p. 365.
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the recent ‘securities lease case’ in The Netherlands. This was a case
in which commercial banks had offered complex financial products
to the general public without explicitly informing them of the risk of
being obliged to repay more than they had invested. Civil courts deci-
sions in these cases were extremely diverse. Some courts ruled that
the banks had made material misrepresentations, others decided
that consumers should have realised that there were extreme risks to
their investment decision. A lot of cases went to several courts with
varying outcomes: some consumers were reimbursed, others were
not. Ultimately, these financial products were regulated by law and
the specific rules were laid down in official guidelines by the Dutch
Financial Markets Authority AFM. These guidelines are now enforced
with administrative law powers.70
The third example, with which we dealt in § 2.4, is a prime example of
an overall lack of enforcement in private law: the dispersal of the
damage over society as a whole renders enforcement a public good.
Given the specificity feature, individual claims will have to be dealt with
on a case-to-case basis, which will prevent most claimants from bring-
ing a claim at all: the costs of submitting the claim are not outweighed
by the prospects of the award. The classical approach taken here is that
these trifle damages should be dealt with by means of public law
instruments.71
The liberalisation of the Dutch energy market for consumers has pro-
duced some examples of disruptive trifle damage. Due to the admin-
istrative problems of energy companies after the coming into force
of the liberalisation of the consumer market, a considerable number
of clients ran into trouble with their energy suppliers.
One of the disruptive trifles that occurred was the lack of prompt
issuance of final invoices to consumers switching from one supplier
to another. Most consumers did consider this a serious shortcoming
of the energy suppliers in their contractual duties, but none of them
actually considered bringing the issue to the civil court: the claim
was uneconomically viable for individual consumers.72 Contrastingly,
the liberalisation process as such was likely to be damaged (e.g., by
the decrease in consumer trust in the process itself by the negative
publicity). The situation was such that private law did not offer a
strict rule on the number of days within which the final invoice had to
70. On this case and its aftermath, see, e.g., Marx 2004, p. 44 ff.
71. Cf. Shavell 1993, p. 279 f.
72. Note that the Dutch Energy and Water Consumer Disputes Commission does deal with
these issues out of court. 
ELL5.book  Page 29  Wednesday, October 18, 2006  10:30 AM
30 Willem H. van Boom
be issued. In response to the obvious state of underenforcement, the
Office of Energy Regulation finally decreed that energy companies
are obliged to issue a final invoice within two months. Compliance
with the decree may now be enforced by means of administrative
penalties by the Office.73 The rule is enforced with some sort of com-
pensation for nominal damages before the Energy and Water Con-
sumer Disputes Commission.74
In-between solutions for the benefit of ‘public goods’ exist as well. A
notable form of such a solution is the power of public agencies to
enforce private law rights for the benefit of the public. For instance,
under English law the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) can file for injunc-
tive relief with regard to unfair terms in consumer contracts for the
benefit of consumers at large.75
4.2 Getting private enforcement back in the limelight
There is no need for strict adherence to either public law or private law
with regard to enforcement issues.76 In public policy theory as well as
in law and economics, the arguments in favour of combined public and
private enforcement efforts are well articulated. These arguments,
which need not be repeated at length,77 include the following considera-
tions: public enforcement agencies lack information, have limited
resources, need to prioritise and therefore cannot enforce all rules with
similar efficacy;78 agencies may or may not maximise enforcement
efforts (we cannot really know as a result of the principal/agent phenom-
enon),79 therefore additional efforts should be welcomed; agencies are in
danger of suffering from ‘agency capture’,80 which could be corrected
with the ancillary instrument of private enforcement; with follow-on
actions, private parties can finish what agencies started.
73. See article 3 Beleidsregel 101977 d.d. 11 februari 2005 van de Dienst uitvoering en Toezicht
Energie.
74. On this alternative dispute settlement board, see European Commission 2000a, p. 25.
75. Regulation 8 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1994; Regulation 12 of the
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999; Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002.
Cf. Basedow et al. 1999, p. 15, p. 126; Office of Fair Trading 2003, p. 18 ff., p. 76 f. Usually,
the threat of OFT seeking an order is sufficient to prompt businesses to change their gen-
eral clauses.
76. Cf. Koch 2001, p. 360. See also Wagner 2006a, p. 435 ff.
77. Seminal Shavell 1984a, p. 271 ff. Cf. Rose-Ackerman 1991, p. 80 ff.
78. Cf. Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 103.
79. On that topic, e.g., Stiglitz 2000, p. 202 ff. Cf. Hawkins 2002, p. 16 ff., p. 415 ff.
80. See, e.g., Faure and Bergh 1989, p. 148; Simpson 2002, p. 86 ff.
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In recent times, there seem to be additional arguments in favour of
strengthening instruments of enforcement in private law. First, there
are myriad of problems that are not (or not yet) subjected to public law
regulation but rather to unwritten private law standards, leaving
enforcement entirely to private law initiatives. There are good examples
of cases in which civil courts generated rules on the basis of broad pri-
vate law standards that were subsequently transposed into public regu-
lation and subsequently enforced by public agencies. So, by enhancing
efficacy of private law enforcement, there may be less cause for devel-
oping public regulations in the first place.
Second, private law standards could be more flexible than rules
under public law. If civil courts could effectively turn flexible standards
into concrete rules for specific cases and then efficaciously enforce
these rules, much could be gained in terms of efficacy. We will return
to this argument later.
An additional argument may be the following. Private law has roots
in society in the sense that private autonomy to instigate a private
enforcement effort may well have serious idealistic or symbolic value
surpassing strict added enforcement value. For instance, a claim – how-
ever insignificant in financial terms from the respondent’s corporate
view – may have lasting effects on corporate behaviour by, e.g., the
intermediary effect of media exposure. In this sense the use of private
law instruments may help ‘empowerment’.
Finally, there is the future of private law itself. Against the back-
ground of a growing number of public authorities assigned with the
duty to monitor and enforce compliance, we should ask ourselves
whether we should not strive for innovation in private law remedies in
order to rediscover the balance between private law and public law. By
tuning the instruments of enforcement in private law, we may preserve
private law as a serious alternative for public regulation. And as choice
between alternatives is a basic notion that ensures competition, it
would be unwise to depart from this notion when it comes to choice of
regulatory instruments.
This argument seems to gain relevance in light of a recent develop-
ment to make government agencies responsible for instigating col-
lective private actions on behalf of specific groups in society. This in-
between solution amounts to public enforcement of private law val-
ues by ascribing private law collective action rights to government
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institutions.81 For instance, in the Netherlands a proposal is currently
pending before parliament to give the Consumer Authority the right
to settle mass claims on behalf of damaged consumers.82 There are
many drawbacks to such government involvement in private law
enforcement. For one, such an intervention deviates from the basic
notion that private self-help has primacy over public intervention.
However, there may be severe market failure – e.g., as a result of
inherent information asymmetry – prompting government to step in.
This assumption would need empirical underpinning in the case at
hand. On the other hand, by assigning to a government agency the
right to act on behalf of individual consumers, the business commu-
nity might be more or less compelled to settle more swiftly and leni-
ently with ‘genuine’ class representatives.
4.3 Building on what has already been achieved
4.3.1 Activating individual action
In this part, I will present some examples in which private law reme-
dies seem to have evolved into more efficacious instruments of
enforcement. With regard to the position of individual claimants, most
jurisdictions have to some extent adhered to modifications to their legal
systems allowing more leeway for efficacious enforcement.
With regard to causation, sometimes use is made of a preponder-
ance of evidence or a shift of the burden of proof. With regard to
damage, sometimes a rough assessment of the extent of the damage
is allowed in case of impossibility to calculate precisely. Additionally,
some jurisdictions explicitly acknowledge loss of a chance as separ-
ate head of damage.83 Moreover, occasionally some form of compen-
sation is awarded in case of breach of a fundamental duty (e.g., the
duty to obtain informed consent prior to a medical operation even if
it is clear that the claimant would probably not have decided other-
wise if he had in fact obtained the information).84
Unfortunately, most of these novelties have been introduced with regard
to the law of damages. This is unfortunate because it proves that the
81. Cf. Hodges 2001a, p. 323.
82. See Bill no. 30 411 (‘Wet Handhaving Consumentenbescherming’). Cf. art. 3 (a) Directive
98/27/EC on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, defining ‘independent
public bodies’ which are specifically responsible for protecting consumer interests. 
83. See supra, § 3.3. On the policy arguments in favour of sustaining claims for loss of a
chance, see, e.g., Jansen 1999, p. 293 ff.
84. Cf. Magnus 2004, p. 576 ff.
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private law enforcement focus is mostly on the compensatory function of
private law remedies while neglecting the amelioration of remedies that
can provide possibly more efficacious incentives for compliance with the
underlying substantive rules.
Therefore, if we are to build on what has already been achieved in
this respect we should seriously ask whether further improving or
intensifying individual damages actions really adds to the preventive
goals of the underlying substantive rules. Damages actions will con-
tinue to carry the burden of the post-facto feature, the restoration fea-
ture and the specificity feature.
In this respect it can be doubted whether the EC Green Paper on dam-
ages actions in antritrust cases85 holds any promise of a relevant exten-
sion of private law enforcement. There is little evidence – but no
evidence to the contrary either – that improving the conditions for
damages actions for individual businesses will enhance the policy
goal of minimising antitrust infringements.86 This does not mean
that it would be wrong to improve the procedural position of the
individual claimant,87 but simply that it would be wrong to focus all
legislative attention on that specific remedy. I feel it would be more
deserving to focus attention on enhancing the legal and factual pos-
sibilities for injunctive relief and group action.
Instead, I feel that the focus of attention should be on innovating other
remedies than individual damages actions. For one, declaratory judge-
ments, prohibitory and mandatory injunctions and recurring penalty
payments (i.e., l’astreinte, Zwangsgeld) for not complying with injunc-
tion orders should be higher on the list of contract and tort law reme-
dies. I will turn to this point in § 5.
4.3.2 Activating interest group action
It has been said that individual and private claims differ in many
respects from public enforcement schemes. A relevant difference is
that the latter does not concern itself with redressing the wrongs
committed vis-à-vis individual persons, but with protecting the general
85. EU Commission 2005.
86. On the arguments in favour of private enforcement of EC Competition law, see, e.g.,
Jones 2004, p. 13 ff., in response to Wils 2003, p. 473 ff.
87. Moreover, individual damages claims are considered to be part of the whole structure of
enforcement of European competition law; see Courage v. Crehan, C-453/99, Judgement
of the Court of Justice of 20 September 2001, paragraphs 26 and 27.
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interest. This does not imply, however, that it is impossible for private
law to focus on collective well-being.88 In fact, in recent years a number
of jurisdictions have given interest groups standing in court to file
specific claims, notably claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. On
a European level Directive 98/27/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers’
interests has indeed prompted debate on extension of the model used in
this Directive for other purposes as well.89
The European picture with regard to interest group actions is one of
diversity.90 For instance, in the Netherlands there is already a very
generous position on interest group standing with regard to both
mandatory and prohibitory injunctions and declaratory relief.91 In
Germany, Verbandsklagen are only allowed to file for injunctive relief
on the basis of specific statutory provisions.92 Suggestions for a
more general statutory framework, however, have recently been
voiced.93 A similar picture emerges from England and Wales.94 In
France, specific statutory provisions (mostly concerning consumer
law) present interest group associations with the right to file an
‘action civile’ or a request for injunctive relief.95 In theory, this ‘action
civile’ can be the basis of a group claim for compensation, but in
practice the ‘action’ is confined to cases of criminal offences and the
damage may not consist of the total of individual damage.96 It seems
that with regard to multi-party compensation proceedings, up to now
England and Wales seem to be the most receptive.97
Another major difference, at least at first sight, seems to be the fact that
public enforcement is based on clear and codified rules rather than
88. Collins 1999, p. 8, even goes as far as to argue that ‘welfarist regulation’ is transforming
contract law regulation.
89. On this Directive, see, e.g., Rott 2001, p. 401 ff.; Howells and Weatherill 2005, p. 592 ff.
90. For an in-depth comparative review of these jurisdictions, see Micklitz and Stadler 2005.
91. Van Gerven et al. 2000, p. 273-275. An example of this generous position is a case in which
the Dutch Consumer Association successfully filed for a declaratory judgement for the ben-
efit of victims of a mass tort (legionnaires disease outbreak at a flower exposition); see
Rechtbank Alkmaar 12 december 2002, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 2003, 68.
92. Van Gerven et al. 2000, p. 272 f. See currently the Unterlassungsklagengesetz (UKlaG), out-
lining the specific cases in which injunctive relief can be pursued. 
93. See, e.g., Micklitz and Stadler 2005. Cf. several authors in Österreichisches Anwaltsblatt
2006/2 discussing the “Sammelklage”. 
94. Office of Fair Trading 2003.
95. Picod and Davo 2005, p. 330 ff.
96. See, e.g, Putman 2005, p. 322; Calais-Auloy and Steinmetz 2003, p. 597 ff., no. 556; Picod
and Davo 2005, p. 332, no. 529. Cf. Howells and Weatherill 2005, p. 593.
97. Hodges 2001a, p. 328; Howells and Weatherill 2005, p. 647 f.
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vague standards that courts sometimes use (or even invent on the spot)
in contract and tort cases. At a closer look, this distinction between
private and public rules is less clear-cut, whereas public law avails itself
more and more of delegating broad statutory powers to regulatory
agencies, which in turn use these powers to formulate abstract duties
of care next to concrete rules and guidelines.
Moreover, by acknowledging private interest group standing with
regard to injunctive relief, policymakers may well stimulate the transi-
tion of private law standards into ex ante rulemaking by the courts. We
will return to this point soon.
5 New and newly rediscovered concepts
5.1 Post-facto incentive damages
In Europe, use of the concept of exemplary or punitive damages is not
widespread.98 Instead, European private law is said not to be of a puni-
tive nature but of a compensatory nature. There are some indications,
however, that a modest shift in paradigm may be near.99 On the other
hand, it is rather unlikely that European jurisdictions would adhere to
the concept of punitive damages to the extent to which it is used in the
United States of America.
However, if we redefine punitive damages as some form of post-
facto incentive damages exceeding the actual loss and aimed at specific
deterrence, then the moderated idea of post-facto incentive damages
could perhaps fit better into European legal culture.100 This concept
seems worth further consideration.
In England and Wales, the Law Commission has in fact prompted
this debate with their recommendation that the remedy of exemplary
damages be used as an efficacious instrument where other remedies
fail (e.g., because there is insufficient pecuniary damage) or where
the respondent’s behaviour is in outrageous disregard of the law.101
98. See, e.g., Bar and Drobnig 2004, p. 109 ff.
99. See, e.g., Viney and Jourdain 2001, p. 4 ff. E.g., some court decisions seem to stress the
need for deterrence by means of exemplary damages; cf. Bar and Drobnig 2004, p. 111.
Cf. The Law Commission 1997, p. 5. See also Wagner 2006b, p. A68 ff.
100. In a similar vein Wagner 2006a and Wagner 2006b, p. A68 ff. Cf. Bolt and Lensing 1993,
p. 78 ff, Hartlief 2005, p. 830 ff.
101. The Law Commission 1997, p. 5 ff.
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The drawbacks of punitive damages are well documented. In theory,
punitive damages can be just and fair from a corrective justice point of
view. This justification would probably restrict the ambit of punitive
damages to cases of malicious and intentional wrongdoing. In practice,
however, respondents may turn out to be judgement-proof, the deep
pockets that are not may well turn out to be corporate wrongdoers with-
out clear intent to harm. Thus, combined with ex ante uncertainty on
the substantive law and jury behaviour, punitive damages can result in
overdeterrence of corporate wrongdoers.102
The empirical evidence for all these drawbacks, however, originates
from the U.S.A. legal system. If we truly want to know whether some
form of pan-European post-facto incentive for prevention has potential
for efficacy, then perhaps specific experiments within the European
legal context should be performed in order to generate data which are
more relevant to Europe. Obviously, there are practical obstacles that
stand in the way of such an experiment,103 but I do feel that it would be
worth trying with regard to specific areas.
Important conditions that could keep such an ‘experiment’ orderly
are the following. First, post-facto incentive damages would have to be
limited to breach of clear-cut statutory duties and repetitive non-com-
pliance with previous civil court decisions. Second, the lapse of time
between the commission of the wrong and the adjudication of the
claim should be limited. Both restrictions would help preventing ineffi-
cacious side effects such as overdeterrence. Third, the amounts would
have to be either limited or calculable by means of an objective stan-
dard.104 Fourth, the legislature would have to decide on whether these
damages may be claimed by individual claimants or merely by interest
group actions.105 Finally, the idea of private fining would have to be lim-
102. Cf. Wagner 2006b, p. A82.
103. Rather more principal although not insurmountable is the obstacle of the Human Rights
Convention. See, e.g., Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, case 8/1994/455/536,
Judgement of the European Court of Human Rights of 13 July 1995, which does not seem
to preclude the use of incentive damages as such.
104. E.g., legislation could limit ‘incentive damages’ to full compensation of all legal and
paralegal cost of the claimant interest group and then double or triple this amount to pro-
vide a ‘piggy bank’ for future litigation. In a similar vein on the ‘Schadens-multiplikator’
Wagner 2006a, p. 464 f. and Wagner 2006b, p. A98 f.
105. In connection with this, the legislature would have to decide whether to implement some
form of contingency fee, because such instruments will stimulate rather than discourage
self-interested behaviour by lawyers and class representatives. On lawyers’ behaviour in
multi-party actions see Schaefer 2000, p. 192 ff. Cf. Department for Constitutional Affairs
1996, nr. 17-71 ff.
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ited to areas in which public enforcement efforts are below an optimal
level – e.g., because of deliberate government priority setting.106
A further point that seems worth considering here, is the disgorge-
ment of profits. In my opinion, there is a strong relationship between
the concept of post-facto incentive damages and the idea that wrong-
fully obtained profits should be disgorged. Admittedly, this is an idea
that is not central to European legal systems, although there are spe-
cific statutory provisions allowing disgorgement.
In my view, for similar reasons stated with regard to post-facto
incentive damages, the idea of disgorgement should be considered,
both from a corrective point of view and from a deterrence point of
view. Especially in areas where the calculation of damages is difficult
but detriment as such is nevertheless plausible.
5.2 Supporting collective self-help
Now and again, politicians feel that private initiative should be empha-
sised more and the policy emphasis should be on civilians being left to
their own devices regarding enforcing the law.107 Usually, this policy
gives cause for retracting financial support from one government
budget, meanwhile hoping that other public budgets will not be
burdened instead. In other instances, there may be a true effort by poli-
cymakers to support self-help, e.g., by stimulating self-regulation rather
than pursuing a ‘command and control’ policy. In some jurisdictions,
the use of self-regulation within specific areas of economic activity adds
to private and individual enforcement.108
On a European level, codes of conduct seem very popular: in EU pri-
vate law policy trade associations and professional associations are
encouraged to develop such codes.109 This instrument may not only
help empower interest groups, but can also facilitate concrete rule-
making from vague private law standards. An example is offered by
the Dutch Advertising Code Foundation, which is based on voluntary
arrangement by the advertising industry. Any consumer can lodge
106. For a similar call for coordination of enforcement by private and public agents, see The
Law Commission 1997, p. 5 ff.
107. See, e.g., Ministerie van Justitie 2005.
108. For an overview of self-regulation amidst possible alternative instruments of regulation, see,
e.g., Ogus 2004, p. 146 ff. (p. 157 ff.); Ogus 1994, p. 107 ff. Cf. Cartwright 2004, p. 121 ff.
109. See, e.g., article 17 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. Cf. Office of Fair Trading
2003, p. 5 ff.
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complaints against misleading advertisements; the board decides
whether the advertisement is in fact misleading and if so, the indus-
try has obliged itself to retract the advertisement.110
Self-regulation may be useful in more than one respect. It may cure
some of the drawbacks of the restoration feature, for instance by
customising some of the vague standards of contract and tort law,
which makes legal decision making easier and better fitted to the
purpose of collective relief.
There is widespread belief that self-regulation is the prime solution
to the private law enforcement deficiencies.111 This, however, only holds
true under specific circumstances, such as the level of organisation
within the relevant branch of trade. Perhaps self-regulation is not
always the likeliest of instruments to use in highly competitive or novel
markets. In any case, when self-regulation falters or fails, legislative
intervention seems to be the obvious policy.
This intervention can take various forms. Acknowledgement of
interest group standing in civil litigation is one of these forms. In theory,
interest groups could help avoiding risks from materialising by using
their powers to apply for injunctive relief (i.e., the right to seek an order
requesting the cessation or prohibition of specific wrongful acts).112 By
allowing this ‘collective relief’ legislators can curb the specificity fea-
ture and the post-facto feature to meet the needs of modern society.
In practice, however, interest groups have little resources to spend
on costly litigation.113 In a sense this is fortunate because limitless
resources will not help finding the enforcement equilibrium. However,
from a political perspective there might be good reason for supporting
‘collective relief’ in areas where private enforcement lags behind and
political pressure to intensify public enforcement is mounting.
For instance, it has been suggested that interest groups should be
allowed to claim exemplary damages or some other form of damage
in excess of individual damage (e.g., damage to ‘consumer inter-
110. The available data show that complaints are usually lodged by individual consumers (88%),
and that private companies (notably competitors; 9%) and consumer associations (1%)
hardly ever lodge complaints. See RCC 2004, p. 13. 
111. See, e.g., the Enterprise Act 2002, according to which the OFT is assigned the task of pro-
moting ‘good consumer practice’ and approving consumer codes; cf. Office of Fair Trad-
ing 2003, p. 5 ff. and Howells and Weatherill 2005, p. 586 ff.
112. On the regulatory role of interest groups see, e.g., Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 54 ff.
Cf. Howells 1998, p. 101.
113. Viitanen 1999, p. 552. Contra: Tzankova 2005, p. 92 f.
ELL5.book  Page 38  Wednesday, October 18, 2006  10:30 AM
Efficacious Enforcement In Contract And Tort 39
ests’) and put these into a fund. With this fund these interest groups
could then finance future litigation in the common interest. To some
extent this is allowed by § 10 of the German Gesetz gegen den unlau-
teren Wettbewerb UWG, according to which consumer interest
groups can claim profit disgorgement in some cases of unfair trade
practice. The disgorged profits accrue to the State after deducting
the cost of claiming.114
So, rational policy may demand that governments identify in which
areas private enforcement could add to or substitute public enforce-
ment, and then provide incentives – be it financial or other – for private
enforcement. This seems an under-developed area of public policy.115
Even more so considering that most European jurisdictions have some
sort of national scheme helping individuals in need of legal aid, but obvi-
ously forgetting the economy of scale when refusing interest groups to
benefit from similar arrangements.116
Moreover, more can be done to stimulate self-help. Group action is
usually associated with injunctive relief, but there is a growing call for
legislators to consider group action for damages as well. Few European
jurisdictions in fact allow compensation claims instigated by interest
group associations, but there can be good reasons for allowing such
claims. Indeed, some sort of European group action for damages could
unite the best of both the civil law and common law worlds.
There is serious scepticism concerning the phenomenon of class
actions. The US example indeed seems to show that with class
actions lawyers win and consumers and businesses lose out.117 How-
ever, this unfair distribution of proceeds may well be caused by traits
of the legal system (e.g., contingency fees, punitive damages, settle-
ment practice and jury bias) rather than by the phenomenon ‘class
action’ as such.118
114. On this topic, see, e.g., Sack 2003, p. 549 ff.; Burckhardt 2005, p. 36 ff.; Micklitz and Stad-
ler 2003b, p. 559 ff.; Wagner 2006b, p. A111 ff. Note that § 34a Gesetz gegen Wettbe-
werbsbeschränkungen GWB restricts group actions for profit disgorgement to industry
associations; cf. Wagner 2006a, p. 408.
115. Cf. Viitanen 1999, p. 561 ff.
116. Cf. Collins 1999, p. 89.
117. Cf. RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1999. For a recent overview of advantages and draw-
backs, see, e.g., Underwood 2004, p. 397 ff.
118. Cf. Basedow et al. 1999, p. 49; Lindblom 1997, p. 822 ff.; Mulheron 2004, p. 72 ff.; on funda-
mental differences between the U.S.A. and Europe in this respect, see, e.g., Hodges 2001a,
p. 339 ff.
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The concept of class action does not seem to enjoy popularity in
Europe. The gap left by failing private enforcement is usually filled
with some form of public enforcement rather than with the post-facto
class action for damages.119 This alternative intervention may take the
form of state-driven intervention, but there are a number of examples
from self-regulation as well.
Note that creative in-between solutions are employed as well. By sub-
sidising private claims or the setting up of alternative dispute resolu-
tion boards, small claims courts with low financial thresholds,
governments sometimes successfully activate private enforcement.120
The problems that we dealt with in the previous paragraphs are very
much at the centre of legislative attention in Europe.121 All in all, this
evolution should be applauded. Group actions instigated by authorised
interest groups – rather than class actions instigated by lawyers – may
overcome the lack of enforcement in cases of trifle damage and may
empower large groups of people otherwise suffering from rational
apathy.122 Having said that, the actual design of a European group
action should be carefully contemplated and adverse experience in
other jurisdictions should be heeded.
With regard to the introduction of a European group action, several
relevant questions would need answering.123 First, who should be
representing the class?124 A class action would empower private indi-
viduals and/or their lawyers, whereas a group action would authorise
acknowledged interest groups with a certain degree of representa-
tion to instigate claims. The former approach seems the more cau-
tious one to take. Second, should these group actions be allowed
with regard to damages? And if so, how would damages be calcu-
lated? Would it include heads of damage that are usually not consid-
ered to be individual damage, such as damage to ‘consumer surplus’
119. Koch 2001, p. 358.
120. Duggan 2003, p. 50 ff.
121. Cf. Frenk 1994, p. 289 ff.; Asser et al. 2003, p. 173 ff.; Stadler 2005, p. 939 ff. See also Euro-
pean Commission 2000b, p. 34: “Other areas where the Commission intends to launch ini-
tiatives concern measures to make it easier for consumers to take legal action collectively
and the definition of the applicable law to non-contractual obligations.” See also Yeazell
1987, p. 10 f.
122. In a similar vein (with regard to trifle damage), Tzankova 2005, p. 128 ff. Cf. Wagner
2006b, p. A107 ff.
123. Generally, see Andrews 2001, p. 263 ff.
124. Cf. Putman 2005, p. 322.
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or ‘the environment’?125 A pressing argument against such a possibil-
ity would be that scheduled fees would give lawyers rather than
stakeholders the incentive to instigate claims. Moreover, possibly the
problem of frivolous claims or settling claims prematurely at a ‘bar-
gain’ could rise.126 Furthermore, opting out in cases of trifle damage
is illusory: ‘rational apathy’ will probably also lead to acceptance of
the default position (i.e. opt-in).127 Perhaps the best way to proceed
here is to experiment with group actions for specific types of trifle
damage and to evaluate after a period of some years what the added
value of group actions is in that particular field. In this respect, the
recent changes to the German UWG present a possibility of experi-
menting with group actions for profit disgorgement.128
5.3 Expanding the protectionary ambit of declaratory judgements
One of the options for stimulating a more central role of civil courts in
the enforcement of private law is the expansion of the protectionary
ambit of declaratory judgements. The classical rule of procedural law,
strongly related to the specificity feature, holds that a judgement can only
confer rights and duties to the parties legally involved in the proceed-
ings.129 However, in practice a decision in one case can be of utmost
relevance in similar cases. If a product is held to be unreasonably
unsafe in one case, it can be presumed to be unreasonably unsafe in
other cases as well. So, in effect, there is much to be said in favour of
generalising court decisions on mass products, services, general
clauses, et cetera.
On an even more general level, it could be argued that it would be
inefficacious for private law to hold on to the specificity feature while
modern society not only treats individuals as such but also – as a result
of, e.g., automated processes and statistical analyses – as members of
several reference groups (e.g., consumers with a specific spending behav-
iour, pensioners, holders of a bank account, et cetera).
125. On this point, see, e.g., Jones 1999, p. 153 ff. With regard to environmental damage,
see the elaborate work by Brans 2001. Note that the 2003 Swedish Group Proceedings
Act – considered by some to be the most inclusive of European statutes on class action – is
very cautious in allowing claims for damages. 
126. Cf. Schaefer 2000, p. 204; Basedow et al. 1999, p. 27 f.
127. Cf. Schaefer 2000, p. 195.
128. For references, see footnote 114.
129. Traditionally, procedural law in civil law countries is badly equipped for involving third
parties into the proceedings. In recent years some adjustments have been made but in
principle the basis still is two-party litigation. Cf. Koch 1998, p. 804 f.
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Against this background, extending a verdict as to confer rights to other
parties than the ones involved in the proceedings can be quite effica-
cious.130 Courts should at least be able to extend declaratory judge-
ments stating that a specific product was unreasonably unsafe, that
specific general conditions are onerous, and a specific feature of a serv-
ice renders it defective, to cases of possible other claimants. In this
respect, the judgement has mass relevance for mass products, services,
and behaviour towards the general public, et cetera, and should be
treated as such.
There are, however, significant obstacles which need overcoming
before such a transposition of individual court decisions into generally
applicable decisions can be realised.131
The instrument of giving priority to lead cases or test cases under
English law (CPR 19.III) consists of measures of procedural economy
that may solve some of the problems put forward here. Moreover, S.
29 of the Swedish Lag om grupprättegång (Group Proceedings Act
2003) stipulates that “the determination of the court in group pro-
ceedings has legal force in relation to all members of the group who
are subject to the determination.”132
Conversely, according to Dutch law a declaratory judgement in
favour of an interest group cannot confer rights to individual claim-
ants in subsequent procedures.133 So, in theory at least, a declaratory
judgement stating that company A has acted wrongfully vis-à-vis its
customers has no nominal value in subsequent claims for compen-
sation filed by individual injured parties.134 This is counterintuitive
and seems a disincentive for interest group enforcement. So, while
the law does facilitate the possibility of a declaratory judgement pro-
voked by an interest group, it does not acknowledge the value of
these judgements beyond the parties between which it was decided.
130. Cf. Schaefer 2000, p. 186.
131. See, e.g., Department for Constitutional Affairs 1996, Chapter 17.
132. Note that this only applies to group members that have opted in. See S. 14 of the Lag om
grupprättegång, stating: “A member of the group who does not give notice to the court in
writing, within the period determined by the court, that he or she wishes to be included in
the group action shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the group.” Cf. Stadler 2005,
p. 947.
133. Indeed, a recent French proposal considers the de jure extension of the ambit of court
decisions in consumer cases to the benefit of third party-consumers. See Rapport Groupe
de travail préside par Guillaume Cerutti et Marc Guillaume 2005, p. 25 and Putman 2005,
p. 324.
134. Hoge Raad 7 november 1997, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1998, 268. Cf. Frenk 1994, p. 313
ff. On this problem, see also Mölenberg 2002, p. 63.
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My argument here is that if we could design a specific procedure that
would ensure a full consideration of the interests involved, then the de
iure extension of the declaratory features of a court decision to other
interested parties is feasible. I believe it could add to efficacy.
A further step would be the expansion of injunctive relief to cover
possible other parties in similar circumstances. This option has been
explored in some legal systems, but there is no shared evolutionary line
in European private law. Obviously, there is the procedural principle
that like cases should be decided alike, but in practice variance may and
does occur. If a clear-cut decision can be delivered between two parties,
why not allow some sort of expansion of the decision – be it with a pos-
sibility of opting out or challenging the decision – for other parties in
similar circumstances?
5.4 Turning the post-facto feature into an ex ante feature
It has been argued that clear-cut rules are better at modifying behaviour
than open textured standards.135 If this holds true, both contract law and
tort law can hardly be considered to be efficacious in reaching behaviour
modification given the post-facto, restoration, and specificity features.
Therefore, turning abstract contract and tort standards into concrete rules
by shifting these features into an effective ex ante instrument of behav-
iour modification may indeed enhance efficacy of private law.
Naturally, this abstract notion needs further elaboration. Further-
more, it cannot be considered to be a panacea for all enforcement prob-
lems in private law. Having said that, in the framework of this lecture I
will limit myself to some general observations. I feel that the ex ante
feature is feasible and worthwhile exploring with regard to corporate
behaviour. Consider an investment ‘product’ involving considerable
inherent financial risks being marketed on the consumer market. After
widespread sales of this product a civil court reaches the conclusion
that this ‘product’ has in fact a design defect in the sense that the adver-
tising and marketing strategy employed by the investment bank in fact
neglected the duty under contract law standards to properly warn con-
sumers of the inherent risks of the ‘product’. Under the post-facto fea-
ture the civil court rules that the financial contracts are void or voidable,
forcing all parties involved to apply the restoration and specificity fea-
tures.
135. Cf. Ramsay 2003, p. 39, referring to Leff 1970, p. 356. Trebilcock 2003, p. 86 refers to
‘wholesale justice’. 
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Now consider the alternative, where the investment bank turns to the
civil court before or soon after marketing the product, or is implied in a
request to the court submitted by a consumer association to ascertain the
validity of the financial contract under private law standards of disclosure
and voidability. Certainty on the validity of the contract at an early stage
– as a result of the ‘advance determination’ by means of the declaratory
judgement – could certainly be a more efficacious remedy.136
Furthermore, consider a workshop where intensive use is made of
noxious substances which are not subject to public regulation but
which are known by specialized personnel to be harmful to employees
exposed to these substances. Due to long latency some years onwards
claims for compensation may arise. Now consider a civil court proce-
dure in which a labour union seeks injunctive relief for the benefit of
the exposed employees at an early stage.137
If courts could be called upon to render these decisions at a very
early stage, and thus give guidance to the conduct of the parties
involved, the underlying private law standards in these cases (viz., the
duty to disclose essential information on risks of the contract ‘product’
and the duty to protect employees from occupational hazards which are
known to the employer respectively) would be turned into clear-cut
rules (viz., give the information and protect the employees respectively)
for corporate behaviour at a very early stage. By doing so, the post-facto
feature could be traded in for an ex ante instrument of more efficacious
enforcement.138
In theory, such an approach could even make the need for ex ante
public law regulation less obvious.139 In fact, the ex ante approach in
contract and tort would mimic public law regulation in the sense that
it has the potential to generate clear-cut rules at an early stage.140 On
the other hand, however, it could be argued that this approach would
leave civil courts with wide semi-legislative discretion without demo-
cratic legitimacy. My argument would be that this is not so much an
inherent trait of the ex ante approach but rather of the fact that civil
136. Consider by analogy the example of the pre-validation service under the 1982 Isreali
Standard Contracts Law, as described by Beale 1995, p. 259 f.
137. In the English legal context a mandatory quia timet injunction under common law for
probable and imminent damage probably comes close to what is meant here. Cf. Murphy
2003, p. 588; Rogers 2002, p. 800 f. 
138. Obviously, the court would have to explicitly address the question whether denying the
injunction would have any effect on the right to compensation if the risk materialises
afterwards. 
139. Compare the conclusions of Kolstad et al. 1990, p. 900.
140. Cf. Shavell 1984, p. 373, referring to the advantages of injunctions.
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courts in effect have been bestowed with the right to design concrete
rules by making use of open-textured standards. This would lead me
to conclude that courts are under a duty to carefully balance their
decisions relative to the extent of the decision: if a court decision can
be expected to govern many cases, the court should invest propor-
tionate efforts in deciding the case.141
Clearly, this sketchy outline needs elaboration. First, I think that inter-
est groups would have to take up the idea that proactive injunctive or
declaratory relief efforts on behalf of the prospective injured may be
more efficacious – and therefore in the interest of their backing – than
individual redress seeking after the accident.
Consider the example of enforcement of intellectual property rights.
Individual copyright holders usually join forces in organisations that
actively hunt to discover infringements, pursue prohibitive injunc-
tions and profit disgorgement for the benefit of copyright holders as
a whole. Naturally, the publishing, music, and software industry
stand to gain from actively pursuing wrongdoers and they therefore
willingly co-finance these private control and enforcement activities.
In some countries, the private enforcement of specific copyrights
has indeed been monopolised by means of exclusive appointment of
a compulsory trustee operating under state supervision.142
Second, there would have to be a procedural instrument by which
potential respondents themselves could file for a declaratory judge-
ment of a civil court. Consider for instance a bank which would like to
be certain whether the information given with a specific banking prod-
uct complies with the civil law standard of, e.g., mistake. By filing a
request with a specialised civil court, the bank could obtain some
certainty on the validity of the ‘product’ and whether the information
accompanying it is sufficient. Obviously, a bank – being a repeat player
with regard to a standardised financial product – would have a clear
interest in filing for such an ex ante declaratory judgement. This would
apply to any repeat player.
Third, the foregoing implies that civil procedure would need recali-
brating as well. Prohibitory and mandatory injunctive relief are not as
widespread and generally applicable in all European jurisdictions as
would be necessary for the purposes dealt with here. Furthermore,
141. Cf. Kaplow 1992, p. 595; p. 621 f.
142. Moreover, in the Netherlands, e.g., the public law enforcement of copyrights infringement is
construed as operated by a semi-state operated agency financed by the private industry. 
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whereas civil courts are reticent in rendering generalising declaratory
judgements, they would need to carefully consider the extent of their
decision. In this respect, the judgement could be rendered with a limited
scope, e.g., by stating that the corporate behaviour in the given circum-
stances constitutes wrongdoing of some sort or is not contrary to the sub-
stantive rule at hand. Afterwards, claimants who have sound arguments
invalidating the declaratory ex ante judgement could be allowed to opt out
from the declaratory judgement.
Fourth, there is the practical point of monitoring. Injunctive relief is
by no means a guarantee that the court decision will be complied with
voluntarily. So who will monitor the implementation of the court deci-
sion? Full monitoring by private or public agents will probably be too
expensive and inefficient.143 Therefore, incentives have to be built into
civil procedure for voluntary compliance by the respondent and some
monitoring by the claimant at the same time. There are several instru-
ments in the various jurisdictions that can help in this respect. Legisla-
tures could start by introducing a recurring penalty payment ancillary to
injunctive relief (that is, if they have not done so already).144 As a result,
the respondent will forfeit a considerable sum of money clearly exceed-
ing the value of his obligation if he does not comply with the court
order.145
In some legal systems injunctive relief is already combined with the
recurring penalty payment, i.e, the provisional obligation to pay a des-
ignated sum of money in the event of non-compliance with the origi-
nal court decision. This has proved to be a useful incentive for
compliance, even more so in conjunction with media attention.146
On the other hand, incentives for the respondent to comply may not
be enough. Then, the claimant interest group may be given financial
or reputational incentives to develop monitor activities. Finding the
appropriate incentive for private interest groups to develop the right
level of monitoring activity is one of the more challenging assign-
ments for European legal doctrine.
143. Shavell 1993, p. 271 f.; Becker 1968, p. 193.
144. Cf. Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
145. Bar and Drobnig 2004, p. 114.
146. Perhaps media attention (e.g., publication of the court decision) should also be a more
prominent part of the private law enforcement toolbox.
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All in all, there are a number of practical obstacles to be cleared before
any ex ante instrument of enforcement grows into a true alternative to
the post-facto feature. Nevertheless I do believe that the ex ante approach
may combine the strong points of private law – viz., flexibility, open
texture standards, and generality – with a higher degree of legal certainty
at an early stage. By clearing up possible uncertainties about the law
beforehand and thus providing more clarity on the required corporate
behaviour the degree of compliance may increase. Clearly, this approach
would assign a more central role to civil courts at an earlier stage of the
enforcement process.
5.5 A challenge for civil courts
Courts have always been at the core of enforcement, but they show
inherent restraints.147 Courts lack important information on other cases
and on the effects of their judgements on third parties.148 Civil courts
are not specialised in particular fields of the law but instead they are
equipped to judge individual cases of varying nature.149 Courts cannot
choose the cases that are put to them (although most jurisdictions do
have some sort of mechanism to refuse unimportant cases). Courts are
relatively immune to political agendas and pressures.150 Conversely,
most civil courts have not been not set up to shift between policy goals
and to prioritise. Moreover, courts do not have a feedback system that
allows them to respond to calls from society; this is worrying in the
sense that contract and tort law are operationalised largely through
court decisions but there is no institutional mechanism for measuring
quality or ‘customer satisfaction’.
These restraints seem to play in the hands of specialised regulatory
agencies that can boast their superior prioritising capabilities, investi-
gation facilities and penal instruments to ensure compliance.151 Never-
theless, in a sense civil courts have been and will always be ‘enforce-
ment officers’. One specific area where courts will be increasingly at
the centre of enforcement, is in the handling of mass claims. For this
purpose, some European jurisdictions have either recently devised or
are currently considering specific procedural rules on court-managed
147. Cf. Schwartz and Wilde 1979, p. 679.
148. Cane 2002a, p. 313 ff.
149. Cf. Schaefer 2000, p. 202.
150. Collins 1999, p. 84.
151. Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 19 ff.
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settlement of mass (injury) claims.152 This will challenge civil courts to
take a more active role in managing complicated litigation, be it multi-
party damage litigation, injunctive relief for the benefit of numerous
people, or declaratory judgements in an ex ante procedure.153
Consider, for instance, the English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) on
the so-called ‘group litigation order’ (GLO).154 A GLO is an instrument
to be used in case of common or related issues among multiple
claimants and/or multiple respondents. A GLO encompasses a so-
called group register set up and maintained in the ‘managing court’.
Although so far the GLO has not been used intensely, it increasingly
seems to serve its purposes for those ‘opting in’.155 For instance, in
2001 a GLO concerning “McDonalds Hot Drinks” was ordered before
the Royal Courts of Justice acting as managing court. The defining
issues here were, inter alia, whether the respondent McDonalds was
negligent in dispensing and serving hot drinks at the temperature at
which it did. Other cases involved claims varying from industrial nui-
sance, public authority liability for harsh conditions at children’s
homes, defective medicine, to cases of restitution of dividend tax.
Furthermore, we can observe that civil courts are already increasingly
subject to specialisation processes. Although there are inherent draw-
backs to specialised courts, it must be conceded that the intricacies of
21st century private law may well force the judiciary to split itself up (or
continue to do so) into several specialised courts. In a sense this may
help increase efficacy because specialisation tends to go hand in hand
with a more active enforcement policy.
Examples of specialisation of courts are the Technology and Construc-
tion Court in England and Wales, Le Conseil des prud’hommes and the
Arbeitsgerichte in employment issues, and the Tribunaux paritaires des
baux ruraux for agricultural lease disputes. Note that specialised
administrative courts may also take over some of the responsibilities
152. See, e.g., the recent Dutch statute on mass claim settlements (Wet van 23 juni 2005 tot
wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en het Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering ten-
einde de collectieve afwikkeling van massaschades te vergemakkelijken, Staatsblad 2005
no. 340).
153. Cf. Stadler 2005, p. 950. One of the reasons for stressing the need for active courts in this
respects lies in the experience that U.S. courts have had with class action settlements;
courts need to scrutinise settlement proposals more closely in order to prevent selling out
by claimant lawyers and respondents. See RAND Institute for Civil Justice 1999, p. 32 ff.
154. See Hodges 2001b, p. 29 ff. Cf. Andrews 2001, p. 258 ff.
155. For a critical evaluation, see, e.g., Mulheron 2004, p. 94 ff.
ELL5.book  Page 48  Wednesday, October 18, 2006  10:30 AM
Efficacious Enforcement In Contract And Tort 49
of civil courts. Examples of this trend include the power of the Com-
petition Appeal Tribunal to decide consumer claims for damages in
case of competition law infringements (S. 47A and 47B Competition
Act 1998).
On a more general level, civil courts should be challenged to take a
more active role in enforcing the substantive rules of private law. In
this sense courts should consider their task in civil law to be not merely
the specific adjudication of rights and duties after wrongdoing, but also
the more general task of giving of more specific guidelines to potential
claimants and respondents how to act and how not to act to prevent
wrongdoing.156 Conversely, some incentives should be built into proce-
dural law for potential claimants and respondents – be it individuals,
businesses or interest groups – to put their case to the court at an early
stage.
6 Considerations for future research
Legal solutions are at best part of a solution to the problems of society.
Obviously, enforcement is not merely a matter of legal rules and forc-
ing society to comply with them. Enforcement is fundamental to the
rule of law. In this respect the analysis offered here is modest in intent.
There is much more to the rule of law than efficacy. Moreover, in this
lecture I merely scratched at the surface of enforcement problems.
What I did intend was to identify some of the features that poten-
tially stand in the way of efficacious enforcement of private law rules
and values. My position is that private law can do better in achieving its
goals. This process starts out with the acknowledgement that some fea-
tures of private law enforcement need recalibrating.
It seems that some parts of private law have been the subject of
intense recalibration over the past decades while others seemingly
have not evolved at all. Compare for instance private enforcement of
intellectual property law with private enforcement of medical liability
law. A short look at Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the
enforcement of intellectual property rights tells us that all kinds of pro-
cedural novelties have been developed (e.g., information duties,
seizure, provisional measures, recall and removal, et cetera) for the
156. In fact, this compels courts to carefully draft their decisions in view of the fact that claim-
ants and respondents have to know exactly what to do in order to comply with the decision.
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benefit of the claimant. Conversely, procedural innovation regarding
medical negligence has been piecemeal. In essence, this field of law
has merely evolved (and is still evolving) into an ever more refined
mechanism for compensation. Within private medical law no ancil-
lary remedies – e.g., for quality improvement or monitoring the
implementation of court decisions – have been developed.
Naturally, it would be too radical a step to suggest that the post-facto,
restoration and specificity features of contract and tort law should be
outright abandoned. Nonetheless we should also take into account that
private law is not just about designing fair substantive rules for society, it
is also about daring to innovate and experiment with enforcement instru-
ments if they fail their purposes. In that respect I feel that some modifi-
cations and alternative approaches in private law are worth further
research. I feel that the possible routes to explore are the following:
• Allowing post-facto incentive damages for negligent breach of a
clear-cut statutory duty or for repetitive corporate wrongdoing, not
to be awarded to individuals but exclusively to authorised private
interest groups for the benefit of litigating other cases.
• Allowing group damages actions for trifle damages, to be instigated
by authorised private interest groups.
• Remodelling injunctive and declaratory relief to such an extent as to
overcome the drawbacks of the post-facto feature and the specificity
feature.
• If necessary, intensifying the use of ex ante interest group action in
specific areas where public law enforcement is suboptimal. Intensi-
fying clearly means investing public funds in this enforcement
method.
• Rethinking the role of civil courts, e.g., with regard to declaratory
judgements and their ex ante role in regulating corporate behaviour.
In this respect, courts should be challenged to render judgements that
surpass the concrete case at hand and that guide future behaviour
instead of merely playing the role of condemning past behaviour.
These seem to be more or less safer routes to explore. Less safe but
perhaps even more efficacious would be the innovation of a more dras-
tic set of remedies, for instance by expanding the use of mandatory
publication of court decisions, or by composing quality scoring lists for
repeat wrongdoers. I feel that the routes suggested here should be the
subject of further research. In any case, I intend to follow this path
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myself for the coming years. Moreover, the routes suggested here
should not only be explored by academics but by legislative bodies as
well. Although the concept of experimental legislation seems to be
unfamiliar to private law legislatures, I feel that some of the efficacy of
the routes suggested here can only be measured by putting them into
practice and evaluating the result. After all, through experiment comes
innovation. We need more understanding of the possible effects of
altering the focus in private law remedies from post-facto, restoration
and specificity towards ‘collective and ex ante’ before we convert to
innovative enforcement. The evaluation of the experiment will help
design lasting solutions.
7 Word of thanks
Having come to the final part of this lecture, there are some personal
comments that I would like to make. In some ways, this inaugural
lecture is not very original. Some parts of the analysis presented here,
were already the subject of the inaugural lecture by professor Hulsman
at this very University some forty years ago.157 There are others having
expressed similar thoughts before and after him. So, I can only hope
that you have found some original thoughts in the past three quarters
of an hour. If not, I console myself with the thought that preparing this
lecture has given me enough ideas to keep me busy for some time to
come.
From a different angle, however, this lecture has been unusual in at
least two aspects. First, there is the language: why not in Dutch? For
one, English is the language of international, interdisciplinary and
comparative private law. So, it is the language I will be trying to speak
in the coming years. Besides, by speaking this language I have pro-
vided you, the audience, with a ‘level playing field’. Whether or not you
originate from the Netherlands or from a foreign country, you can now
all complain over drinks that the lecture was incomprehensible without
having to blame the language barrier. You can now really blame me.
Second, it is rather unusual for a law professor to hold an inaugural
lecture some three years after having done so at another excellent uni-
versity. Therefore, I would like to thank my former colleagues at
Tilburg University for continuously pressing me to look beyond the
obvious. By accepting this position in Rotterdam, I think I did.
157. Hulsman 1965.
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By appointing me, this University has demonstrated the ability to look
beyond the obvious as well. I would like to thank the University’s Exec-
utive Board for appointing me. Moreover, I would like to express my
deep gratitude to the Law Faculty’s Dean Professor Marc Loth, for
giving me the opportunity to embark on a new adventure.
In addition, I would like to pay special tribute to the private law
department, and the members of the civil law section in particular, for
their cordial welcome and the generous cooperativeness with which
they started a new future with Siewert Lindenbergh and myself. Thank
you, professor Lindenbergh, for accepting partnership in this section’s
enterprise. I hope and trust it will be a profitable partnership.
Finally, words of thanks to my family, who always seem to ask the
right questions that put life in perspective, such as: ‘what is the most
relevant sentence of your lecture?’
Ik heb gezegd.
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